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or no prior experience with any of these (particularly metaphysics and 
action theory) will, I think, have a hard time making it through this book.
This will not be the last book on omissions. While Clarke does an admi-
rable job laying out the broad outlines of various debates pertaining to omis-
sions and offers a wide variety of interesting examples to chew on, it does 
not deliver a full-orbed, positive theory of omissions. Perhaps, however, 
this is the most that we can (and should) expect from a book that tries to 
make a substantive contribution to a largely disorganized field of research.
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Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Account, Volumes 1 and 2, 
by Craig S. Keener. Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2011. Pp. 1210. 
$ 65.00 (hardback).
JOHANNES GRÖSSL, University of Siegen
In his two-volume magnum opus, Miracles, Biblical scholar Craig Keener 
engages in a philosophical analysis of the reliability of miracle claims. Al-
though the book’s subtitle and the author’s specialization might suggest 
an exegetical focus, the two central themes of the book are scrutinizing 
and critiquing David Hume’s anti-supernaturalism and presenting an as-
tonishing collection of eyewitness claims of miracles in antiquity as well 
as in the modern era. For this review I will concentrate on his philosophi-
cal argumentation.
Keener’s main interest in writing a book on miracles is “challenging 
the Western anti-supernaturalist readings of the Gospels and Acts” (2). He 
realizes that this challenge cannot be undertaken without taking into ac-
count non-Biblical miracle claims in order to maintain coherent rationality 
criteria for historiography. Keener names his two central theses right at 
the beginning: “eyewitnesses do offer miracle claims” and “supernatural 
explanations . . . should be welcome on the scholarly table along with other 
explanations often discussed” (1). Keener’s second thesis is thus rather 
weak: Instead of arguing for “supernatural theism,” he merely claims that 
it should not be ruled out a priori (8): “[I]f one presupposes neither theism 
nor nontheism, one must examine evidence for particular miracle claims 
inductively to see if a pattern emerges” (161).
In the first part of the book, Keener presents early Christian evidence 
for miracle claims (21–34) and miracle claims outside Christianity (35–65), 
afterwards comparing both sides (66–83), most notably Early Christian 
and Jewish miracle accounts (71–72). Here, Keener evaluates the genre 
question as critical: while miracles are often presented “to make a homiletic 
point concerning a teaching,” New Testament miracles intend to “validate 
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Jesus’s person and mission rather than just a particular teaching” (73). In 
conclusion, Keener claims that “miracle reports in the Gospels and Acts 
are generally plausible historically” (7).
In the second part of the book, Keener criticizes materialistic anti-su-
pernaturalism, trying to unmask it as an unsubstantiated worldview. A 
miracle is defined as an “extraordinary event with an unusual supernatu-
ral cause.” He raises the question whether God is “bound by the orderly 
processes of nature” (87), highlighting that the term “contrary to nature” 
has in the past mainly been used to make claims regarding moral law (nat-
ural law) and not regarding the abrogation of laws of nature (87). Keener 
fails to engage with theological (for example neo-Thomist, divine hidden-
ness or theodicy-related) arguments against interventionism; just as Alvin 
Plantinga does in Where the Conflict Really Lies, he simply presumes that 
if there is a God who created the laws of nature, there is no reason why 
He should not abrogate them from time to time. Later in the book he first 
quotes Polkinghorne (“After all, God is the ordainer of the laws of nature, 
not someone subject to them”), followed by the rather strong thesis that 
“[n]o one who believes in historic monotheistic understandings of God 
would deny the possibility of God influencing the system of nature” (129).
Under this presumption that theism implies possible interventionism, 
he concludes that interpreting miracle claims as consequences of actual 
miracles might sometimes be the most parsimonious (and therefore most 
rational) explanation (103). Keener then offers a widespread critique of 
Hume’s argument against miracles: “One cannot inductively prove a neg-
ative without examining every possible instance” (105, cf. 167). Hume’s a 
priori exclusion of supernaturalism resulting from his deistic worldview is 
deductive (cf. 143) and thus inconsistent with his inductive epistemology 
as well as with his account of causation. When defining a divine miracle as 
God abrogating the laws of nature, one cannot simultaneously hold that 
laws of nature are only regularities which we come to know by induction 
from a great number of singular events (134: “Natural law is, after all, 
merely our construct of how nature functions”).
Keener claims that Hume’s argument is not only inconsistent due to de-
duction but also circular. Hume wants to prove anti-supernaturalism by 
defining criteria for testimony which by definition rule out any evidence 
for supernaturalism. Keener responds by arguing that if one adopted 
Hume’s criteria for the credibility of eyewitness claims for non-miracu-
lous historic events, one would need to “rule out any historical testimony 
to any event”; this is why moderate empiricists view Hume’s rejection 
of testimony as irrational (148). Hume’s a priori anti-supernaturalist 
presumption is exposed with his quote that “no testimony is sufficient 
to establish a miracle” (145), contradicting a moderate reading of Hume 
according to which only “miracle testimony in history so far had been un-
trustworthy” (149). The charge is that “Hume prevents his own argument 
from being falsified by rejecting evidence that contradicts his thesis” (162). 
Accordingly, even miracle claims that fulfilled Hume’s evidential criteria 
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(recent, public, attested by many witnesses) were rejected by Hume (165) 
on similar grounds as they are today: any person who claims to have wit-
nessed a miracle is irrational for making such a claim and is therefore not 
a reliable witness.
A general critique of Hume’s epistemology involves the correlation of 
the unusualness of an event and the unreliability of a report concerning 
it (157). Keener regards such a correlation to be “methodologically falla-
cious” and exemplifies this with an historic example: “[O]n March 1, 1950, 
all fifteen members of a church choir arrived late for choir rehearsal . . . 
that church building exploded . . . their lateness prevented any lives from 
being lost” (157). Although the probability of a supernatural explanation, 
if not excluded a priori as a genuine possibility, is by definition rather low, 
the described event might (if interpreted as a random conjunction of sin-
gular accidents) be attributed an even smaller epistemic probability. If we 
were to dismiss all testimony below a certain probability level, we would 
need to dismiss all claims about very improbable events, for example a 
friend’s claim about having won the lottery; this is why Keener believes 
that Hume’s “principle of relative likelihood” (158) is rendered absurd.
Later, another argument of Hume is discussed: that “incompatible re-
ligions claim miracles and thus . . . their claims cancel each other” (193). 
Keener responds that it is a logical fallacy to reject strong claims simply 
because weaker ones [with contradictory implications] exist (197).
In the third part of the two-volume work, Keener surveys supernat-
ural claims in various times and cultures. He claims that Hume’s anti-
supernaturalism is strongly ethnocentric (223), citing studies that show 
that “socialization rather than exposure to science account for most of 
the skepticism” towards miracles (215): “Plausibility structures—what 
intuitively strikes us as rational—are culturally determined” (211). Most 
worldviews, says Keener, “affirm the reality of supernatural phenomena” 
(205). In the chapter “Majority World Perspectives” (211–263), the global 
sociology of supernaturalism is analyzed, concluding with a remark that 
supernatural phenomena such as healings “seem to appear with special 
frequency in cultures and circles that welcome them” (263). Based on this 
evidence, Keener concludes that the “modernist assumption that genuine 
miracles are impossible is a historically and culturally conditioned prem-
ise” (764), even insinuating “ethnocentric elitism” (762) to his opponents.
In the following chapters, numerous examples for supernatural claims 
are collected, including ones from Asia (264–308), Africa, Latin America, 
and the Caribbean (309–358), from earlier Christian history (359–425), and 
the recent West (426–507). A separate chapter gathering dramatic stories 
about healings, raisings, and nature miracles is added (508–600). The col-
lection includes the famous report of the raising of Jeff Markin, who fully 
recovered after reported to be brain-dead and without heartbeat for forty 
minutes (577–578). Like all other miracle claims, Keener relays these reports 
without any critical comments, which does not mean that he accepts them 
unquestioned; he wants these reports to be discussed without assuming 
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that they must be wrong due to their supposedly contradicting the laws of 
nature. Keener does not want to argue for the historicity of any singular re-
port, but claims that given the large number of eyewitness claims through-
out history, it is irrational to dismiss all of them. This is even more true 
when we are dealing with cases that do not obviously contradict the laws of 
nature but only occur with an extremely low probability. Regarding nature 
miracles, he claims that the majority of reports “need not imply activity 
impossible in nature, but the collocation of events can prove extraordinary” 
(592). Given “the abundance of eyewitness claims to what we consider na-
ture miracles, there is no reason to doubt that eyewitnesses in Jesus’s day 
could have made similar claims in what they believed” (598–599).
In the fourth part of the book, Keener discusses alternative explana-
tions regarding miracle claims, among those fraud (614–615), temporary 
healing through emotional arousal (617–619), medically documented 
beneficial effects of religious belief on physical health (620–624), and psy-
chosomatic elements of faith cures (630–644). Applying Occam’s razor on 
placebo interpretations of Jesus’s healings, he comes to the conclusion that, 
if one does not rule out supernatural explanations from the beginning, the 
explanation involving a real miracle is definitely simpler and thus more 
plausible than reformulations involving psychosomatic elements (636). In 
the chapter “Biased Standards” Keener discusses the alternative explana-
tion that most events regarded as supernatural are scientifically possible 
yet statistically very unlikely events. He criticizes that scientific studies 
(and even the Vatican) exclude all miracle claims that can be explained 
as highly unlikely natural phenomena; analyzing the famous Vancouver 
study on the correlation of prayer and healings he found that even in its in-
troduction the authors commit to the thesis that God only works through 
natural causes; furthermore he claims that the study is not representative 
(648–650). Keener lists “spontaneous remission, psychosomatic illnesses, 
or exaggerated rumors” and the attribution of significant improvements 
of patients to “suggestion and mass hypnotism” (649) as ad hoc naturalist 
explanations (646). Keener acknowledges that in many cases the natural 
explanations are more plausible (cf. 759: “Some claims of supernatural 
healing are clearly false”), but there are also cases in which a supernatu-
ral explanation is more plausible (653–656), even if normal natural factors 
cannot be ruled out (759). Keener concludes that many “employ criteria 
specifically designed to screen out any evidence that might support the 
objectionable conclusion of supernatural causation” (711).
The last round portraying miracle reports (712–759) ends with a list of 
particular miracle claims Keener finds to be convincing. In order to con-
clude whether a supernatural explanation seems more plausible for a par-
ticular case, he applies credibility criteria such as the personal connection 
to the witness, whether psychosomatic elements are conceivable, and how 
frequently comparable events occur.
Keener definitely establishes his first thesis (“eyewitnesses do offer 
miracle claims”) by showing that the supposed uniformity of human 
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experience is false, since there were and still are millions of miracle claims 
around the world, throughout different eras and different cultures (763), 
and a large number not easily dismissed. His reproduction of sociologi-
cal analyses regarding the belief in supernatural events backs his thesis. 
Accordingly, Keener challenges anti-supernaturalists for a better argu-
mentation: “In today’s postmodern climate, those who would deny the 
possibility of miracles need to provide supporting arguments more effec-
tive than an appeal to a nonexistent consensus or an appeal to the ‘unifor-
mity’ of human experience” (761).
I will now focus on specific philosophical and theological issues in 
Keener’s work. Keener makes two interesting points regarding interven-
tionism. The first is that if natural law comprises both what is naturally 
and “supernaturally possible,” one could view God “as an agent modify-
ing causal conditions . . . without ‘violating’ natural law” (133–134). No 
miracle would then be violating natural laws, but only contradict our con-
struct of natural regularity. Later, Keener is open to defining God’s work-
ing through the created order “at a higher level” (181). The second point is 
that he compares divine action with human action (134). Keener explicitly 
presumes that agents by definition can modify causal conditions with-
out violating the laws of nature: “Because it focuses on repeatable natural 
events, physical science does not predict all specific actions of intelligent 
agents. . . . We do not speak of human actions as violating nature simply 
because the laws of physics do not predict them” (182–183). Therefore, 
if our understanding of natural law must be indeterministic not only by 
integrating randomness but also allowing for human intervention, there 
cannot be a conflict between science and divine intervention (cf. 184–185). 
Keener neither discusses theories about how human and divine interven-
tions correlate nor scrutinizes what kind of divine actions would be con-
ceivable under this analogy; he only mentions the often-held claim that 
God is working through human agents (179) and explores divine actions 
through visions and dreams in an appendix (870–884). At another point he 
refers to the analogy again, stating that science “depends on predictions 
of the physical world; its method is not meant to provide mathematical 
predictions of human (or divine) actions” (609). An argument derived 
from this claim could be: if the possibility of divine actions is ruled out as 
unscientific, any (free) human action must be ruled out, too.
Keener does not only bring counterarguments against a Humean epis-
temology, but he also attacks anti-supernaturalism with arguments from 
philosophy of science: “Science is meant to address nature’s regularities, 
not anomalies” (152). Just as theists are often charged with using a God-of-
the-gaps explanation, most naturalists explain naturalistically inexplicable 
events by promising a naturalistic explanation in the future—Keener calls 
this optimistic view naturalism-of-the-gaps (187), later described by a quote 
saying that “in cases where something appeared to be a miracle, it might 
simply reflect a law of nature not yet discovered” (652–653). However, 
dogmatically excluding the existence of an intelligence outside nature is, 
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so Keener, unscientific (198); maybe the metascientific belief in the world’s 
rational intelligibility held by scientists even entails a belief in God (199). 
Another attack on anti-supernaturalism involves the possible fear follow-
ing from accepting its consequences: rejecting potential supernatural ex-
planations “from utilitarian fear of where they could lead also prejudices 
the discussion” (207).
What may repeatedly strike critical readers is Keener’s repetitive and 
depreciative use of the term “closed-minded,” applied to everyone who 
does not regard supernaturalism as a serious possibility when engaging 
with miracle reports: “There is some sufficiently strong evidence today 
to meet an open-minded nonsupernaturalist’s bar of proof, if never that 
of a closed-minded antisupernaturalist” (607). One wonders whether 
there might exist any reasonable or open-minded anti-supernaturalists. 
Another issue alienating many readers, especially philosophers, is the 
fact that hundreds of reports of supernatural events are interwoven with 
philosophical and theological arguments, many of which appear in differ-
ent forms in various chapters. A clear separation of miracle collection and 
epistemological argument would clearly be advantageous.
Furthermore, although he does a fine job in presenting and discussing 
Hume’s epistemology, I do not think that Keener has managed to establish 
his second thesis, that accepting supernaturalism for some cases is more 
plausible than the alternative. Here, the remarks on the correlation of 
prayer and healings are crucial. Keener notices that one needs to take into 
account all prayers without effect: “Not only are many not healed . . . , many 
have died without healing even in movements that emphasize healing, 
despite abundant prayer for them” (605). When depicting the Vancouver 
study he observed that “the [study’s] committee emphasized the dashed 
hopes and disappointed faith of those not cured” (650). In the appendix, 
Keener adds that his personal struggles “now are for the vast numbers 
of people in the world . . . who need healing of some sort or another and 
do not have it” (767). What appears here as a remark in his “Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript” should have been a major argument in the philo-
sophical discussion. At the point where this discussion is rudimentarily 
conducted, Keener employs a hidden divine hiddenness argument. Miracles 
are not scientifically proven yet, because they do not “happen commonly 
enough to allow a statistical perspective on what proportion of these oc-
casions happen during prayer” (663);1 “if one prays for a thousand ge-
nerically sick patients, the odds are good that many will recover with or 
without prayer and even with or without medical treatment” (673);2 it is 
1A related argument for the non-predictability of miracles which implies that they cannot 
be scientifically dealt with is that “we cannot always predict a personal deity’s future actions. 
. . . If miracles happened with absolute regularity, we would view them as part of the course 
of nature; their occurrence beyond providence in nature allows them to function more spe-
cifically as signs revealing God’s activity and character” (741).
2Keener even refers to studies analyzing miracle claims in Lourdes: One of them shows 
that less than 0.02 % of sought cures happen, “certainly significantly lower than the expected 
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“difficult to procure statistics for supernatural healing claims here” (704); 
supernatural healing claims are “more common . . . in settings least acces-
sible to modern controlled clinical studies . . . especially among the poor” 
(704); one “wonders whether a deity acting like the God of the Gospels 
and Acts would be expected to offer ‘signs’ by participating as an actor 
in a controlled experiment” (710). Although Keener does not specifically 
give an argument here, it seems as he wants to say that God chooses to act 
only in cases which cannot establish a strong argument for his existence, 
possibly in order to maintain the freedom of non-believers not to believe. 
God might usually act only in a way such that the results of his acting 
are indiscernible from coincidence. This claim would fit well to Keener’s 
observation that miracle claims are “surprisingly common” in regions 
where such events are expected (761). Another manifest claim worthy to 
be discussed would be whether faith or at least “open-mindedness” is a 
requirement for the possibility that miracles occur, as could be deduced 
from Jesus’s failure to heal in his hometown of Nazareth.
Keener’s analysis and critique of Hume, although trivial for most phi-
losophers, manages to establish his case. His remarks on science and faith 
(692–697) concluding that all science rests on metaphysical assumptions 
should be basic knowledge for philosophers, but since the targeted audi-
ence is broader, Keener was well-advised to integrate Feyerabend’s claim 
that different scientific paradigms are incommensurable. Keener often 
calls for a paradigm shift to re-integrate possible supernaturalism into 
a scientific paradigm (691). There are numerous interesting and debat-
able arguments a philosopher can find between the lines. Keener’s task 
of reconciling faith and science by confining both is highly respectable. 
Unfortunately, theological discussions about God’s possible confinement 
regarding special intervention is not to be found, neither an elaborate 
analysis of the Thomistic argument that God can only act through second-
ary causes, nor a discussion whether the theodicy problem can only be 
solved by either advancing skeptical theism or non-interventionism.
Altogether, Craig Keener offers an astonishing collection of supernatu-
ralist claims. This book might be the best collection of miracle reports so 
far, not only because of the number of reports listed, but also due to a vast 
amount of quoted sources and an enormous bibliography. This collection 
is combined with a thorough philosophical analysis and discussion of Hu-
mean naturalism. By merging the descriptive and the normative approach 
Keener should succeed in making those readers arbitrarily dismissing su-
pernaturalist claims as implausible not only rethink their metaphysical 
assumptions, but also critically evaluate claims regarding supernatural 
events, whether they are dealing with free human action or with divine 
action in the world.
reported cure rate through medical science.” This means that the “cure rate is abysmally 
low—perhaps no better than one would find in hospitals dealing with the same number of 
‘incurable’ patients” (678–679).
